Over the past year, issues important to public administration have figured prominently in the Federal Court docket.
This section of Policy Perspectives reviews federal court cases of particular significance to public servants and public administrators. Only Supreme Court or Court of Appeals cases to which the Supreme COUlt has recently granted certiorari were selected.
Government Mfrrmative Action Programs
In Adm 'and Constructors Inc. v. Pena ,! an opinion with farreaching implications for government affinnative action programs, the Supreme Court held that all federal racial classification schemes must serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. 2 In other words, to be upheld, they must survive strict judicial scmtiny.3 However, despite the definitive language of the majority opinion, an investigation of previous Supreme Court cases detailing affitmative action plans suggests that the long-tenn impact of Adarand may be difficult to predict.
The controversy in Adarand concerned a Department of Transportation (DOn policy to give financial incentive to prime contractors to hire minority contractors on federal highway constmction projects:! Under tlle policy, contractors who subcontract a sufficient percentage of their work to "socially or economically disadvantaged firms" are given financial compensation.; The Small Business Admillistration's 8(a) program proVides the guidelilles by which the DOT determilles a firm's status as disadvantaged. Under tlle 8(a) program, Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Pacifics, Subcontinent Asians, Native Americans, and women may be presumptively designated socially and/or economic all y disadvantaged. 6 In Adarand, petitioner offered the low bid on a federal 68 highway construction subcontract, but was turned down in favor of a firm which met the statutolY definition of disadvantage. 7 Petitioner brought suit, complainillg that the government program under which the subcontract was awarded, and by which general contractors on government projects are given a financial incentive to prefer a class of individuals on the basis of race, violated petitioner's Fifth Amendment due process rights.
H By challenging the DOT program, petitioner also challenged the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program which is tlle basis for numerous federal affirmative action programs. Both the District COUlt and the Court of Appeals found for the government-implicitly approving tlle use of the affirmative action program in the controversy.9 However, the Supreme COUlt vacated and remanded tlle case for fUlther proceedillgs in light of its opinion. lO Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, began the Adarand opinion by discussing the history of Supreme COUlt affirmative action jurisprudence. The Court's previous treatment of affirmative action programs had been premised on, variously, the origin of the program (state or federal), the purpose of the program (benign or malign) or the race of the individuals helped or hurt by the program. Easterbrook's analysis divided questions about the appropriateness of judicial deference into three broad categories: 0) where delegation occurs and Congress gives an agency the power to engage in formal rule-making or administrative adjudications, the most substantial judicial deference is required; (2) where a statute gives an agency only the authority to make discretionary choices in pursuit of a particular goal, a COUIt must respect (but not defer to) these chOices; and (3) The LHWCA "provides for compensation of workers injured or killed while employed on the navigable waters or adjoining, shipping-related land areas of the United
States."so In Newpo11 News, a party became eligible for and received LHWCA benefits due to a work-related injury.51 However, a decision by a Benefits Review Board denied additional available benefits to the party under the LHWCA, finding that the employee was partially disabled and was only owed partial-disability benefIts. 52 A dispute arose and was refened to an Administrative Law Judge who confirmed the decision of the Board. 53 The Director sought standing as "a person adversely affected or aggrieved" under § 921© to pursue a federal COUlt challenge to the Board's deciSion, contending that the decision interfered with the performance of her administrative duties and her ability to achieve the purposes of the Act. 54 The original party did not seek review and, in response to an inquiry by the Court of Appeals, expressly declined to take part in the proceeding. 55 The Court of Appeals denied the Secretary standing, and the Supreme COUlt granted certiorari. 56 Writing for d1e majority, Justice Scalia was critical of the Director's reliance on the phrase "person adversely affected or aggrieved," a statut01Y phrase which Congress generally intends to apply to private litigants concerned wid1 private interests. 57 He could find no precedent in case law, under the Administrative Procedure Act, or in the United States Code's general judicial review provision indicating that an agency in its regulatory or policy-making capacity could be "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by benefits decisions affecting private parties. 58 Justice Scalia acknowledged that, under § 939© of the LHWCA (where a party is dissatisfied by the result of his appeal) d1e Director can offer to proviele "legal assistance in processing a claim."s9 However, in this case the party stated no dissatisfaction with the out-come of his claim,w
In the course of his opinion, Justice Scalia articulated several conditions under which an agency may bring a cognizable claim in response to a decision concerning the rights of a private person: (1) if the decision hampered an agency's performance in any areas of express statutory responsibilities; oj' (2) if the decision impaired the responsible agenc.y's ability to process "important administrative and enforcement responsibilities"; or (3) where Congress has explicitIy made adjudications the responsibility of the agency seeking to state a claim. 61 None of these instances were in evidence in Newport News,"> The jUrisprudential presumption underlying the Newport News decision is that private parties will resolve disputes concerning private interests, particularly when, as here, the agency has no explicit statutOlY authorization to sue,oJ Justice Scalia declared that before officials such as the Director in NewpD1t News may challenge adjudications of private patty interests they must first establish that they have "a clear and distinctive responsibility for employee compensation",M Here, the Court held that the Director had failed to show how any of her stated injuries fell within the scope of this requirement. As such, tI1e majority affirmed the Comt of Appeals decision, In a separate case last term, the Seventh Circuit refused to give deference to the Federal Reserve System Board of Governor's interpretation of the Expedited Funds Availability Act (EFAA),>5, In First Illinois Bank and Tn/st 0. Midwest Bank and Trust,'" the court assigned jurisdiction over disputes between "depositolY institutions" to the Federal Reserve System instead of to the courts,"7
The initial action heai'd by the District Court concerned First Illinois Bank's attempt to recover damages as a result of Midwest Bank and Trust's alleged negligent failure in a banking matter,''" The District COlut held that Midwest hac! t~tiled to compolt WitI1 tI1e relevant standard of care and entered a judgment for First Illinois,h~' However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit determined tImt the District COUlt had no jurisdiction over the matter and it'> judgment was vacated,7/1 According to the Seventh Circuit, the District Court erroneously interpreted the EFAA.71 Under one section of the Act, "any action .. ,may be brought in any United States district court ... .',n However, under a different and, according to the Seventh Circuit, controlling section, only disputes between "depository institutions" and "any person other than another depository institution" may be brought before a court,73 Both patties in Fit'sf Illinois Bank conceded that they were "depositOly institutions" within the meaning of
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the EFAA,71 Disputes such as these, according to the Seventh Circuit, are to be resolved administratively by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,75 (The Board of Governors, in a friend of the court brief had disclaimed authority under the Act to resolve such disputes administratively, and objected to the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the EFAA,7")
The COlut held that tI1e agency's assertion of statutOlY powerlessness was insufficient to compel a finding of judicial jurisdiction,77 Rather, the comt refen"ed to tIle characteristics that distinguish the claims depositors bring for adjudication (which involve legally enforceable rights) from those brought by depositolY institutions (which involve obligations amenable to administrative proceedings),7H These distinctions, according to the Seventh Circuit, reflect congressional intent to assign the former controversies to the COUlts and tIle latter to agencies,;") Given that this controversy fell into the latter categOlY, the comt assigned jurisdiction over the matter to the agency,
Application of the First Amendment to Government Employees and Corporations
Questions arose last term surrounding the applicability of the First Amendment to entities integrally involved with government processes. In Lebron v, National Railroad Pm, :'Ienger C01poration, "" the Supreme Court held that where "the government creates a corporation by special law, for tI1e furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is palt of tI1e Government for the purposes of the First Amendment. "Hl In its opinion, the COUlt articulated several factors under which such corporations may be deemed government agencies (and their employees held to be government employees).
Lebron involved a National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) policy prohibiting political adveltising on billboards within its domain,"' Petitioner challenged the Amtrak policy, arguing that Amtrak's actions circumscribed his First Amendment rights and should be subjected to the same evaluation as the actions of any government entity would be,HJ Amtrak responded by citing it" autI10rizing statute which declares that [Amtrak] "will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government."HI Amtrak asserted that its authorizing statute prevented it hom being considered a government entity for the purposes of a First Amendment inquiry,"' The District COUlt ruled that Amtrak was a government actor, and that its action violated the First Amendment. HI ' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme COUlt granted certiorari. 87 Justice Scalia, writing for the majOlity, held that where, as here, a government agency's actions implicate the constitutional rights of citizens, it is the Constitution, not the agency or Congress, that will determine the permissibility of the agency's actions.AS In other words, if Amtrak is the government according to constitutional dictates, First Amendment restrictions apply as they would to any government agency, regardless of any congressional pronouncements to the contraty. As such, Amtrak's reliance on its authorizing statute was erroneous. In Lebron, the Court went a step fl1rther and held that a corporation is an agency of the government complete with the constitutional obligations of government when (1) the corporation has been specifically created for the pursuit of governmental objectives, and (2) corporate operations are controlled by the government d1roUgh its appointees?~ Amtrak, unlike Planters' Bank, fit this description. 
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The Miller standard is distinct from a series of previous cases concerning ilie implementation of Section 5. 
Administration of Federal Desegregation Decrees
In Missouri v. jenkins,171 the COUlt held that judicial evaluation of school desegregation orders should turn on whether the constitutional violator has "complied in good faith with the desegregation decree ... and whether the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable."m Commensurate with this standard, the Court prohibited federal judges from including constitutionally compliant school districts in efforts to desegregate constitutionally defective district(s).173 In so doing, the Court scaled back the discretion allowed federal judges charged with the administration of federal desegregation decrees.
In jenkins, the State of Missouri challenged a Federal District Court judge'S authority to implement certain remedies pursuant to a school desegregation order. 17 " In dispute were the District Court's orders requiring (1) salary increases for instructional and non-instructional staff within the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD); and (2) continued state funding of remedial education programs within the KCMSD. 175 Rather than attempting to remove the racial identity of given schools within the KCMSD, which was 68.3 percent black, the District Court sought to attract students from predominantly white suburban school districts (SSDs).17(, Both the lower COutts that heard the jenkins dispute prior to the Supreme Court found the SSDs in compliance with the Constitution, and as such could discern no justification for including them in the District Court's desegregation program. 177
In resolving the dispute in jenkins, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on a previous Supreme Court case, Milliken v. Bradely.17A The Milliken court articulated a tl1ree-part blueplint for a permissible desegregation decree: (1) the remedy must be germane to the condition which violates tl1e Constitution; (2) tl1e remedy must be restorative, seeking only to put the victims of the prohibited conduct in the position they would have occupied minus such conduct; and (3) the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs must be a factor in the calculus of the court devising the remedy.179
Based on the Milliken standard, the jenkins court held that the Disuict Court's desegregation program was outside its remedial authority. Chief Justice Rehnquist ctiticized the District Court's inclusion of SSDs in its remedial plan for tl1e KCMSD, characterizing this practice as tl1e implementation of an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict violation. loo According to the Chief Justice, in the absence of an interdistrict violation causing an interdistrict effect, an interdistriet remedy is not needed.
1AI Furthermore, the Chief Justice declared that demographic changes and external factors beyond tl1e control of the state that affect minority student achievement are explicitly impermissible considerations in the remedial scheme. lB. Thus, after jenkins, a federal judge may not attempt to attract non-minority students from outside a predominantly minotity school district to moderate the effects of segregation. 1H3 Rather, a judge must taiJor his or her desegregation decrees specifically to the offending conditions in the district.
A factor tl1at received increased attention in jenkins, and which promises to militate against disu-ict cO\.ut desegregation orders in the future, was local conu'o!' According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Supreme Court precedent requires that Significant weight be placed on the local autonomy of school districts. 181 Consequently, district courts assigned the administration of desegregation decrees must seek to restore state and local autl10rities to the control of school systems, once "the reduction in achievement by minOrity students attributable to ptior de jure sew<:gation has been remedied to the extent practicable.,,185 Reliance on this factor could signal increased hostility in the Supreme Court toward Federal court attempts to administer desegregation orders.
Notes
'115 s. Ct. 2097 (995). lId. at 2117.
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'Surface TranspOltation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, 23 u.S.C § 106(c) (1) 469 (1989) (state and federal affirmative action programs are to be treated the same). 12 488 U.S. 469 (1989) . The standard consisted of three general prongs. First: any racial or ethnicity based classification mllst undergo strict judicial scrutiny. Second: government classifications are subject to strict scrutiny regardless of dle race of fuose burdened or benefitted by a particular classification. Third: judicial analysis of governmentally implemented racial classifications will be tile same whether such preferences originate in fue Federal (subject to the 14th Amendment) or state (subject to the Fifth Amendment) government. Ct. 1278 (995) .
